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ABSTRACT
This paper presents a theoretical model to show how distributional concerns can engender social
conict. We have a two period model, where the cost of conict is endogenous in the sense that
parties involved have full control over the level of conict they can create. Our analysis highlights
the crucial role of future inequality. It is shown, equality of assets or income in the current period
does not stop conict from taking place if the anticipated future inequality is signicant. Further we
nd that the impact of inequality on conict is not straightforward. Since conict is costly for both
groups, societies with low levels of inequality show no conict; groups engage in conict only when
inequality exceeds a certain threshold level. Additionally the model shows that the link between
inequality and conict may be non-monotonic.
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1 Introduction
This paper presents a simple model showing how distributional concerns can engender social conict.
We focus on the phenomena of intra-state conict that has become common in recent years (Stewart
et al. 2001). It is usually manifested in terms of widescale demonstrations, protests, strikes and
sometimes violent rebellions, leading to severe disruption of economic activity.1 This can weaken a
countrys institutions and severely impede its economic progress. In fact, many of the states in the
poorest regions of the world have gone through serious intra-state conict in the recent past. While it
may be plausible that conict may exacerbate the existing levels of poverty and inequality, a number of
studies have demonstrated the opposite. MacCullouch (2001) after controlling for several factors such
as income, military expenditure and country and time specic e¤ects, observed that higher inequality
can lead to higher conict. Nafziger and Auvinen (2000) using an improved inequality data set and
a broader denition of conict nd a strong link between inequality and war. Other studies such as
Alesina and Perrotti (1996), Cramer (2003) and World Bank (2003), point to economic inequality as
an important cause of conict.2
In this paper, we provide a theoretical framework to analyze the link between inequality and con-
ict. In particular our emphasis is on wealth inequality and conict. In mainly agrarian economies,
for example, land inequality closely reects wealth inequality and the distribution of land can be a
source of discontent. In Central American countries, such as El Salvador and Guatemala, strong
reliance on agro based exports led to an extremely disproportionate amount of land in the hands of
a few rich and powerful interests. This resulted in serious conict with those who have been dispos-
sessed (Brockett 1988). In a recent study Macours (2011) nds that the growing inequality between
the landed and landless fueled the Maoist movement in Nepal. But inequality in assets is not just
limited to land inequality. One of the important reasons for conict in Angola and the D.R. Congo
was for the control of the natural resources.3 The share (or the lack of share) of the di¤erent groups
in these resources can be seen as the source of asset inequality.
The emphasis on asset based inequality does not in any way reduce the importance of other factors,
historical, ethnic or religious, in creating conict. In fact our analysis presumes the polarization of a
society into rival groups.4 How these groups are formed and the ensuing tensions between them are an
essential part of any description of conict. We take these group formations as given.5 In essence,
therefore, this paper models the impact of group inequality (or horizontal inequality) on conict.
There is a growing body of evidence which implies that more than inequality among households (or
individuals), what matters for conict is the inequality among groups. The groups here are broadly
dened and presumes a fractionalization along ethnic, religious or economic class lines.
Using national surveys for 55 developing countries, Ostby (2007, 2008) nds strong evidence that
countries with high levels of systematic between group inequalities in terms of households assets and
1We do not distinguish between violent and non-violent conict here. See Nafziger et al. (2000) and Sachs (1989).
2Collier and Hoe­ er (2000) do not nd any signicant impact of inequality on conict. However, for the problems
with their paper refer to Cramer (2003) and Nafziger and Auvinen (2002, p.156).
3Q&A: D R Congo Conict, B.B.C News, December 15, 2004 and Country Prole: Angola, B.B.C News, May 3,
2005. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk.
4Esteban and Ray (1999) discuss how the distribution of the population across di¤erent groups e¤ect conict. They
nd that conict is the highest under a symmetric bimodal distribution, i.e. when the society is polarized. Empirical
evidence of polarization (based on ethnic lines) leading to conict has been reported by Matlova and Reynal-Querol
(2005).
5For the dynamics of group formations see Garnkle (2004a, 2004b).
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education does have a higher probability of an outbreak of civil war. More detailed case studies have
also established the importance of group inequality in fostering conict (Nafziger et al. 2000; Stewart
2001). In a recent paper using a rich cross-country data set and a better indicator of group inequality
Cederman et al. (2011) nds a strong link between group inequality and conict.
To demonstrate how group inequality and conict are interlinked, we use a two-period game
framework which is similar to Garnkel and Skaperdas (2000) and Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996).6
However, unlike those models, the groups here directly choose the level of conict, rather than choosing
between productive and defensive activities.7 Another di¤erence with the previous papers lie in how
the joint output is distributed. In standard choice theoretic models, the share of each group depends
on the amount of resources the groups invest in enhancing their relative capability to capture a larger
share of the output. In contrast, we presume an underlying social contract between the groups
when it comes to the distribution of joint outputs. This contract may be arrived at through some
bargaining process between the groups. In this sense our model is closer to Banerjee and Duo (2003)
and Rodrik (1998). The shares of the groups, in our model, depend on the relative levels of wealth.
If a group is relatively wealthy, then presumably it can have more leverage in the bargaining and thus
be able to appropriate a larger share of the output. The current level of group wealth inequality
is then reected in a more skewed distribution of income between the groups in the future. Whilst
Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997) discuss distributional issues in the context of conict, it is in a static
framework. Also, unlike their model, ours does not allow conict in the absence of inequality.8 In
addition, one of the features of their model is that groups with higher appropriative capabilities enjoy
a larger share of the output. By specifying a stable social contract through the distribution rule, our
model refrains from such an anarchic situation.
Yet we are able to demonstrate how future group wealth (asset) inequality can tip a peaceful
society into conict. Since higher inequality leads to a more skewed distribution of the joint output,
beyond a certain level of inequality the costs of engaging in conict are less than the benets of a
higher share of the output resulting from the conict. We proceed to show that even if wealth and
income were equally shared, conict may still arise, so long as there is a possibility of future inequality.
This is similar to Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1996) who nd that a longer shadow of the future can
in fact harm cooperation and intensify conict. Taking the analysis further, we argue that conict
just does not simply increase with inequality and the disadvantaged groups are not the only ones to
engage in conict. At higher levels of inequality both the advantaged and the disadvantaged groups
may engage in conict which is what we often see when repressive measures are undertaken by the
advantaged group (and in many cases by governments aligned to the advantaged group) to suppress
the conict initiated by the disadvantaged group. We also nd that as inequality rises the potential
increase in conict may be high enough to act as a disincentive for groups to participate in production
processes, the sharing of the output of which is the main source of conict. We show that the link
between inequality and conict is non-monotonic.9
6We, therefore, broadly follow the choice theoretic approach. For other approaches to modelling conict and inequality
see Benabou (1996) and Somanathan (2002) among others.
7Addison et al.(2003) and Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) also take a similar approach as ours.
8 In a similar context, Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) present a dynamic model, but they also allow for conict under
perfect equality. Further, unlike ours, the groups in their paper do not incur any cost in the current period to initiate
conict.
9 In a similar vein Milante (2004) also nds a non-monotonic relation between wealth inequality and conict. However,
the structure of his model and the general result di¤er signicantly from ours.
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The plan of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we describe the basic structure of the
model used in the paper including the production technology, the consumption decisions made by the
groups, the social contract and the stages of the game between the groups. In Section 3, we analyze
in detail how future group inequality and current levels of conict may be related. The following
Section discusses some extensions of the model and Section 5 concludes the paper with some discussion
about the policy implications of our results. For the rest of the paper, inequality will imply wealth
inequality between groups.
2 Model: Basic Framework
Consider two groups, i and j, involved in the production of output over time periods, t = f1; 2g. The
groups are endowed with one unit of indivisible human capital each period. They can produce the
output jointly or fall back on their own production. If they decide for joint production, then their
share of the joint output in each period is determined by a rule based on their wealth in that period
wit and w
j
t . We assume that there is no wealth inequality to begin with. Thus w
i
1 = w
j
1 = w
0.
2.1 Production
For the joint production case, we assume that the groups divide an exogenously given level of output
say Rt in each period. Further, Rt+1  Rt, that is in each period the joint production is at least
as large as the previous period. Let hmt 2 f0; 1g represent the level of human capital used for joint
production by any group m = i; j. The joint output is given by
Yt = Rth
i
th
j
t . (1)
When either hit = 0 or h
j
t = 0, Yt = 0. If joint output is produced, it is equal to Rt.
Output under own production for group m is
Y mt = w
m
t (1  hmt ). (2)
Thus when e¤ort in joint production hmt = 0, own output for group m will be w
m
t . On the other
hand if hmt = 1, Y
m
t = 0.
We assume that the joint output is far greater than the combined total of each groups own
production, that is Rt  wit + wjt . Wealth levels do not e¤ect the joint output, but it does e¤ect
the level of own production.10 Both groups receive a part of the joint output according to some
distribution rule, which is discussed next.
2.2 Social Contract
Social contract or the sharing rule is of crucial importance in any conict model. This paper will not
be an exception in that regard. In the literature, the exogenous distribution rules (known as contest
10Here we have assumed that wealth is used for own production. However, another interpretation is possible where
wealth is used to buy some insurance against the possibility that the alternative of joint production may not be realised.
Under this interpretation, the amount of output received in case of the failure of joint production is equivalent to the
level of initial wealth.
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success functions) are represented by proportional sharing rules, with an emphasis on a winner-takes-
all feature.11 This type of sharing rules is appropriate in analyzing situations of war, where there is
an element that the victor commands all the resources. However, most conict that we see today is
intra-state conict, be it peaceful protests or civil war. For such cases the winner-takes-all feature
may not be appropriate, since the loser may still be receiving some share of the resources, albeit a
very small one. This feature is particularly desirable for conict situations and not all distribution
rules share that property (Hirshleifer 1989).
In our model, similar to Banerjee and Duo (2003), we propose an exogenous sharing rule for
the joint output based on the fact that if either of the groups decides not to take part in the joint
production, their fall back option is their own production. Keeping this aspect in mind, we propose
the split-the-di¤erencesharing rule,
dit = Y
i
t + (1=2)(Yt   Y it   Y jt ); (3)
djt = Y
j
t + (1=2)(Yt   Y it   Y jt ); (4)
where i and js share of the joint output, given by dit and d
j
t , depends on the di¤erence in the outputs
from own production between the two groups (which in turn depends on the wealth levels).12 Equal
levels of wealth will result in an equal distribution of the pie. We would assume that the share of the
joint output that each group receives is greater than their respective level of own production, that is,
dit > Y
i
t and d
j
t > Y
j
t for t = 1; 2, which would incline the groups towards joint production. Note
that both groups have equal bargaining power under this sharing rule, but more general rules can be
used.
2.3 Conict
While both the groups have some control over the production aspect (in the sense that they can
choose between joint and own production), they have little control over the sharing rule of the joint
output. In such a case, if group i is unhappy with its share of the joint output, dit, it can resort
to conict. It is important to note that as in Banerjee and Duo (2003), conict does not a¤ect
the sharing rule. In this model conict takes the form of destruction of the other groups share of
the joint output. There is, however, no direct appropriation of the opponents share. Our model,
therefore, does not discuss looting.13 When one group indulges in conict, it not only harms their
opponent, but also adversely e¤ects its own income, albeit not to the same extent.
Let nit and n
j
t represent the level of conict that groups i and j respectively choose in time t. In
particular, nit is the proportion of destruction of group js share by group i and similarly n
j
t is the
proportion of destruction of group is share by group j. The net income of the groups under joint
production will be
yit = (1  knit)(1  njt )dit, (5)
yjt = (1  nit)(1  knjt )djt , (6)
11See Hirshleifer (1991), Skaperdas (1992) and Skaperdas and Syropoulous (1997) among others.
12This is the same as the Nash Bargaining Solution with equal bargaining power, which has easy intuitive interpreta-
tions and strong axiomatic foundations (Muthoo, 1999). Their own output levels act as the outside options.
13Refer to Azam (2002) for a model that includes looting.
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where k < 1 reects limited self damage. For simplicity, the rest of the analysis will assume the
proportion of self-damagek = (1=2).
Each group, however, has to incur a mobilization cost for engaging in conict. We model the
cost as
 
(nmt )
2dmt =2

where it is increasing in the level of conict and the groups share of the joint
output, dmt . It reects the intuition that to mobilise, groups may have to sacrice a part of their joint
output. This is evident in many conicts when groups often sell rights on the contested resources to
third parties in return for up-front nancial support needed for mobilisation (Ross 2003).
Further, we assume that no group has the ability to destroy each others wealth. It is often
the case in conict that wealth or resources of groups are based in territories over which they have
exclusive control.14 Thus it may be that each groups own wealth are better protected than their
respective shares from the joint output. Anbarci et al. (2002) makes a similar assumption where they
consider endowments of the groups to be inalienable. Hence if own production takes place then the
net income of each group will be
yit = w
i
t and y
j
t = w
j
t . (7)
Under own production, there will be no conict since it is costly in terms of mobilization and there is
no associated benets as the wealth levels remain unchanged.
The total amount of conict in period t in the society, denoted by nt, should involve some aggre-
gation of the level of conict by both groups. Although di¤erent aggregation rules are possible, in
this paper we consider the additiveaggregation rule, where the total conict is the sum of the level
of conict engaged in by each group.
nt = n
i
t + n
j
t : (8)
2.4 Consumption and Savings
Both groups choose a level of consumption (and therefore a certain level of savings) and a level of
conict in each period, to maximize the groups lifetime utility. Since period 2 is the nal period,
there will be no savings and hence both groups will consume their total income in that period. The
groups, however, have to incur a mobilization cost for engaging in conict. Similar to Dixit (2004, p.
41) we assume that the utility is linear in consumption and the cost of mobilization increases at an
increasing rate with the level of conict. Thus any group m = i; j, would maximize the following,
V m(cm1 ; n
m
1 ; n
m
2 ) = V
m
1 + V
m
2 = c
m
1  
1
2
(nm1 )
2dm1 + [y
m
2  
1
2
(nm2 )
2dm2 ]; (9)
s.t. cm1 + s
m
1 = y
m
1 ;
cm1 ; n
m
1 ; n
m
2  0;
where cm1 and s
m
1 are the level of consumption and savings for group m in period 1 and  < 1 is the
discount factor.
For analytical tractability we will also assume that for both groups savings is proportional to the
level of income, i.e. sm1 = y
m
1 for all m = i; j where   (1=2).15
14For instance, FARC rebels controlled vast parts of southern and eastern Columbia (Veillette, 2005). Similarly,
LTTE had de-facto ruled northern and eastern Sri Lanka (Stokke, 2006).
15This is not a very restrictive assumption since similar conditions can be derived from the model without a¤ecting
the results. Suppose rj  ri. If an additional constraint cit  c; cjt  c (which reects a minimum level of consumption)
is added to (9) then so long as :ri  1 (i.e. marginal future gain from saving outweighs the marginal loss of current
5
2.5 Inequality
We dene wealth inequality, It, as the di¤erence in wealth levels in period t,
It =
wjt   wit :
Since wj1 = w
i
1 = w
0 there is no wealth inequality in the initial period. Thus I1 = 0.
The inequality in period 2, however, will be determined by the di¤erence in wj2 and w
i
2 which in
turn are a¤ected by the level of conict in period 1. The greater the amount of conict, the lower will
be the net incomeof the groups (see (5) and (6)) and hence the lower will be the amount of savings.
In other words under joint production savings by each group in period 1 is negatively related to the
level of conict ni1 and n
j
1. However, if joint production fails, there is no conict and savings then
would be a proportion of the outside option which is w0. Thus for all m = i; j,
wm2 =
(
rm(sm1 (n
i
1; n
j
1) + w
0) under joint production
rmw0 otherwise
:
rm is the interest factor on the gross savings in period t.
To distinguish between pre-conict and post conict inequality in period 2, we introduce the
concept of anticipated inequality which captures the level of inequality that would exist if there was
no conict. The initial level of future wealth inequality before any conict will be instrumental in
deciding whether the groups want to engage in conict or not in the rst place. Suppose there is no
conict in period 1, i.e. ni1 = n
j
1 = 0, then from (5) and (6) we know y
i
1 = y
j
1 = (R1=2). Thus savings
for both groups in period 1 would be si1(0; 0) = s
j
1(0; 0) = (R1=2). The anticipated level of wealth
inequality in period 2 when there is no conict in period 1 is represented as
Ia2 = (r
j   ri); where  = (R1=2) + w0: (10)
Note that there is heterogeneity in returns to the savings of the two groups. This will be the crucial
element which will drive the conict in this paper. As in Saint Paul and Verdier (1997) this di¤erence
in the rate of returns could be thought of as arising out of di¤erential access to capital markets.
For rest of the paper we will assume, without loss of generality, that group j is the fortunate (or
the advantaged) group and group i is the unfortunate (or the disadvantaged) group, i.e. rj > ri. For
the sake of simplifying the analysis we normalise the return of the disadvantaged group to ri = 1,
which means that the disadvantaged group gets no return on their savings.16
2.6 The Game
We represent the interaction between the two groups as a game G. Given that the distribution rule
is xed, G is a two period game with each period consisting of the following two stages:
Stage 1: Knowing the distribution, the groups can decide either to produce on their own (hit = 0,
or hjt = 0), or to produce jointly (h
i
t = 1, and h
j
t = 1). It does not make sense to have a situation
consumption), we can show sit = y
i
t   c and sjt = yjt   c. It can be checked that the results that follow under the
assumption st = :yt for both groups, will also go through for this alternative specication.
16However, this is not a severe restriction. All the analysis below will go through so long as the return the disadvantaged
group receives is less than 100%. More precisely, the analysis below will hold for all ri 2 [1; 2] where  = (1 )
:
> 1.
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where one group goes for joint production and the other group goes for own production. Thus we
rule out such situations.
Stage 2: If they decide to produce jointly, then each party decides on the level of conict, that is,
(ni1 and n
i
2) for group i and (n
j
1 and n
j
2) for group j.
The strategy for each group is to choose in both periods whether to take part in the joint production
and the level of conict. Let (nit ; n
j
t ) represent the equilibrium level of conict and h
i
t ; and h
j
t
represent the equilibrium human capital input of group i and j respectively for the joint output.
Denition 1 A subgame perfect equilibrium is given by the quadruplet (nit ; n
j
t , h
i
t (n
i
t ; n
j
t ); h
j
t (n
i
t ; n
j
t )),
t = 1; 2 such that each players choice is a best response to the other player and satises sequential
rationality.
We shall use the backward induction approach to nd the subgame perfect equilibrium of the
game.17
3 Future Inequality and Equilibrium Level of Current Conict
In this section we demonstrate the role of future inequality in engendering conict and investigate how
conict evolves with the changes in future inequality. We nd that under certain restrictions on the
parameters, for zero or very low levels of inequality neither group engages in conict, for higher but
still low inequality only the disadvantaged group engages in conict in equilibrium; however, when
levels of inequality are high, both groups engage in the conict. Later we use these results to uncover
the link between inequality and total conict.
As groups engage in conict, the realised level of future inequality will di¤er from the anticipated
level of future inequality prior to any conict. This is because conict will bring down the level of
inequality by reducing the overall level of income and thus savings. Our interest in this section is
with the level of future inequality that groups anticipate before they engage in conict. First we show
that in the most general case the groups will not engage in conict in the nal period irrespective of
the level of inequality.
Proposition 1 No group will engage in conict in the last period.
Proof. Suppose both groups are engaged in joint production in period 2. Using (5) and (9), for
group j, V j2 (n
i
2; n
j
2) = maxf(1  k:ni2):(1  nj2):dj2   12 :(nj2)2:dj2g. Since any increase in nj2 will reduce
V j2 , group j will not engage in conict. The same will hold true for group i. Hence, n
i
2 = n
j
2 = 0. If
one of the groups decides to engage in its own production in period 2, then by denition ni2 = n
j
2 = 0.
As there are no benets from conict in the last period, none of the groups engage in conict.
What about conict in period 1? Consider group i. Given (5), (9) and ci1 = (1  )yi1, in period 1,
group i will choose 0  ni1  1 such that it maximizes the following:
V i = (1  )(1  kni1)(1  nj1)di1  
1
2
(ni1)
2di1 + 
1
2
(R2 + (s
i
1 + w
0)  rj(sj1 + w0))
17We show in the Appendix (Proposition A1) the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium for game G.
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where di1 = d
j
1 =
R1
2 and s
i
1 = y
i
1, s
j
1 = y
j
1. The rst order condition for group i will be
@V i1
@ni1
=  (1  )(1  nj1)kdi1   ni1di1 +

2
(rj(1  knj1)dj1   (1  nj1)kdi1) = 0: (11)
Similarly the rst order condition for group j will be
@V j1
@nj1
=  (1  )(1  ni1)kdj1   nj1dj1 +

2
((1  kni1)di1   rj(1  ni1)kdj1) = 0: (12)
The best-response functions of each group can be derived from their rst order conditions.
Rearranging (11)),
ni1 =

2
[rj(1  knj1)  k(1  nj1)]  (1  )k(1  nj1):
This can be written as, ni1 = A + Bn
j
1 where A =
h

2 (
Ia2
 +
1
2   )
i
, B =
h

2

   Ia22
i
and  =
(1  )= > 1. The best response function for group i is then
ni1 =
8><>:
0 if A+Bnj1  0
A+Bnj1 if 0 < A+Bn
j
1  1
1 if 1  A+Bnj1
: (13)
A represents the amount of conict group i will engage in when it initiates the conict and B is the
change in ni1 resulting from a change in n
j
1. Whether A 7 0 and B 7 0, depends on the level of Ia2 .
From (11) it can be deduced that, Ia2 7 (2   1)=2 implies A 7 0. Thus, when inequality is
lower, the damaging impact of conict by group i on current consumption is far greater than the
positive impact on future consumption that such conict generates. For higher levels of inequality,
the positive impact of increased future consumption dominates.
On the other hand, how ni1 responds to changes in n
j
1 > 0 depends on whether B 7 0, and thus
whether 2 7 Ia2 . For Ia2 < 2, an increase in n
j
1 will also increase n
i
1, while for I
a
2 > 2 an
increase in nj1 will have an opposite impact on n
i
1. This is because for group i, from (11) it is evident
that, when inequality is lower, the marginal benet of increasing ni1 in response to an increase in
nj1 on current consumption is greater than the marginal cost on future consumption. As inequality
increases the marginal cost in terms of reduced future consumption increases. Thus, beyond a certain
level of inequality, group i is better o¤ by reducing ni1 in response to an increase in n
j
1.
Rearranging (12) we get,
nj1 =

2
[ri(1  kni1)  rjk(1  ni1)]  (1  )k(1  ni1);
which can be written as nj1 = C+Dn
i
1, where C =
h

2

1
2  

 +
Ia2
2
i
< 0 andD =
h

2

 +
Ia2
2
i
>
0. Group js best response then is
nj1 =
8><>:
0 if C +Dni1  0
C +Dni1 if 0 < C +Dn
i
1 < 1
1 if 1  C +Dni1
: (14)
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It is useful to start the analysis of conict and equilibrium with the case where anticipated in-
equality is at its lowest, that is Ia2 = 0. For this special case, from (13) and (14) we can show that
A = C and B = D. Thus the intercept and gradient of the best response functions are the same for
both groups. This leads to the best response functions of the two groups as shown in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1.
Note that given 0  ni1; nj1  1, the intercept term for the best response for group j is ( C=D) and
for group i is ( A=B). As is evident from the gure above, the unique intersection of best responses
is at the origin. Thus, under joint production in period 1 there will be no conict.
As inequality rises, A will increase and become positive. Let Ia2 be the level of inequality when
A = 0. With further increase in inequality, A will eventually be greater than ( C=D). SupposebIa2 is the level of inequality such that ( C=D) = A. We show below that with higher inequality,
conict will occur which will reduce the income from the joint output. Thus for both groups the
gap between the joint output and own production will narrow. Let eIa2 reect the level of inequality
where atleast for one of the groups, the payo¤ from joint production under conict is the same as the
outside option. In the next three sections we use these threshold levels of anticipated inequality Ia2 ,
0 < Ia2 < bIa2 < eIa2 , to show how conict evolves with increase in inequality. In particular, we discuss
three regimes with the following broad features:
 low inequality, where 0  Ia2  Ia2, leads to joint production with no conict in equilibrium, as
for ;
 medium inequality, where Ia2 < Ia2  bIa2 , again leads to joint production in equilibrium, but now
with positive conict from the disadvantaged group only;
 high inequality, where bIa2 < Ia2 , implies joint production still, but now with both groups engaged
in positive conict if bIa2 < Ia2 < eIa2 , and equilibrium collapses to own production if eIa2  Ia2 .
3.1 Low Inequality and Conict
When the level of inequality is low, such that Ia2  Ia2, none of the groups will engage in conict.
As anticipated inequality increases from 0, best responses change gradually. Most important in
this rst regime is the fact that the intercept term A of group i, increases and reaches 0 when
Ia2 = (2   1)=2  Ia2. For between 0 and Ia2, best response for both groups produce the same
qualitative outcome as Figure 1, namely zero conict. Thus the only equilibrium is at the point
where ni1 = 0 and n
j
1 = 0. Therefore, total conict under low inequality is n

1 = n
i
1 + n
j
1 = 0.
To see whether the groups will engage in joint or own production, rst consider period 1. Since
ni1 = n
j
1 = 0, the share of each group from the joint output will be R1=2. On the other hand under
own production they will get w0. Thus the groups will engage in joint production if R1  2w0. Since
we know that for all t, Rt  wit + wjt , the condition for joint production is thus satised for both
period 1.
In period 2, from Proposition 1 we know there will be no conict. Therefore, using (5), (6) and
(10) we can show that group i (the disadvantaged group) and j will receive (R2 Ia2 )=2 and (R2+Ia2 )=2
respectively. The period 2 wealth of group i and j is respectively wi2 and w
j
2. Note that the wealth
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are also the outside options of the groups. The joint production would be realised if (R2  Ia2 ) > 2wi2
and (R2 + Ia2 ) > 2w
j
2, which implies R2 > w
i
2 + w
j
2. Thus irrespective of the level of savings and
conict in period 1, in period 2 there will always be joint production.
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the game is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 2 For the level of inequality Ia2  Ia2 = (2   1)=2, the subgame perfect equilibrium
is (ni1 = 0; n
j
1 = 0, h
i
1 (n
i
1 ; n
j
1 ) = 1; h
j
1 (n
i
1 ; n
j
1 ) = 1) and (n
i
2 = 0; n
j
2 = 0, h
i
2 (n
i
2 ; n
j
2 ) = 1;
hj2 (n
i
2 ; n
j
2 ) = 1).
In this case group i, the disadvantaged group, would not initiate conict since the di¤erence in
inequality is not high enough to merit engaging in conict, a part of the cost of which it has to bear.
Since the disadvantaged group does not initiate conict, the advantaged group does not engage in
conict. Thus in equilibrium there is no conict and joint production takes place.
The condition Ia2 = (2   1)=2 reects the fact that if the future is less valuable, for instance
when ! 0, then there would be greater tolerance for inequality, since the level of inequality, where
no conict takes place, Ia2, will increase. On the other hand, when ! 1 the groups value the future
more, which will result in less tolerance for future inequality since Ia2 will decrease.
3.2 Medium Inequality and Conict
As the level of inequality, Ia2 , increase we move from low inequality to a medium inequality regime
where Ia2 < I
a
2  bIa2 . We split the discussion of medium inequality into two cases: (a) Ia2 < Ia2  2,
and (b) 2 < Ia2  bIa2 .
When Ia2 < I
a
2 < 2, the best response functions of the groups are shown in Figure 2 below.
Insert Figure 2.
The best response function of group i (13) translates to an intercept A with gradient (1=B) in
Figure 2. Given the bounds on the level of inequality, it is easy to establish that 0 < A  1 and
0 < B < 1. Similarly, the best response function of group j (14) has intercept 0 < ( C=D) < 1
where C < 0 and gradient D < 1. Notice that in the presence of non-negativity constraints on levels
of conict, C < 0 implies that the best response function for group j extends to the origin, with a
kink at ni1 = ( C=D). Further, one can show that, given  > 1, ( C=D) > A.18
Next consider the case where 2 < Ia2  bIa2 . As noted before, bIa2 represents the level of inequality
such that ( C=D) = A.19 The implication of Ia2 > 2 is that the slope of the group is reaction
function now becomes negative. So beyond this point, if the advantaged group engages in conict,
the disadvantaged group will reduce its level of conict. Figure 3 shows the reaction functions of the
two groups in this situation.
Insert Figure 3.
18Also note that D < 1 < (1=B), i.e. group is reaction function is steeper than group js. This reects the fact that
group j has more to lose by escalating the conict and hence would increase its own level of conict at a lower rate than
group i.
19 It is shown in the Appendix (Proposition A2), there exists a level of inequality bI2 such that ( C=D) = A. More
precisely from ( C=D) = A it can be infrerred that bI2 is that level of inequality such that 1(bI2)2 + 2bI2 + 3 = 0;
where 1 = 1=2; 2 = [((2 + 1)  4)=4] and 3 = [((0:5  ) + 1)   1)=2].
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From Figures 2 and 3, it becomes clear that in case of the joint production, (ni1 = A; n
j
1 = 0) is
the equilibrium level of conict. Group j, the advantaged group, does not engage in conict. The
intuition is simple; ( C=D) reects the level of conict engaged by group i that will be tolerated by
group j. Hence, so long as the level of conict (which is group is intercept term A) is less than
( C=D), group j shall not engage in conict.
If there is joint production, the overall level of conict will be
n1 = n
i
1 + n
j
1 =


2
(
Ia2

+
1
2
  )

: (15)
Di¤erentiating with respect to Ia2 we get @n

1=@I
a
2 = =2 > 0, i.e. as the level of future inequality
increases, overall conict will also rise.
However, whether both the groups will decide for joint production or not depends on their initial
level of wealth. In period 1, the disadvantaged group under joint production in equilibrium will
engage in conict, i.e. (ni1 = A; n
j
1 = 0) and thus from (9) will thus receive (1   (A=2))(R1=2).
Therefore, the disadvantaged group will participate in joint production if (1  (A=2))R1 > 2w0. For
the advantaged the condition will be (1 A)R1 > 2w0. In the second period, as shown earlier, there
is no conict and both groups engage in joint production since R2 > wi2+w
j
2 continues to hold. The
equilibrium can be characterized as follows:
Proposition 3 Given (2   1)=2 < Ia2  bIa2 , and (1 A)R1 > 2w0, the subgame perfect equilibrium
is (ni1 = A; n
j
1 = 0, h
i
1 (n
i
1 ; n
j
1 ) = 1; h
j
1 (n
i
1 ; n
j
1 ) = 1)and (n
i
2 = 0; n
j
2 = 0, h
i
2 (n
i
2 ; n
j
2 ) = 1;
hj2 (n
i
2 ; n
j
2 ) = 1).
Here while one of the groups engages in conict, the other refrains from conict. This is unlike
Benhabib and Rustichini (1996) and Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997), where both groups always end
up engaging in conict, although only one group might have initiated it.
3.3 High Inequality and Conict
Now consider the case where bIa2 < Ia2  Ia2.20 The best response functions for both groups would now
be the following:
Insert Figure 4.
If there is joint production, then the equilibrium levels of conict for both groups (from the best
response functions (13) and (14)) are
ni1 =
A+BC
(1 BD) ; (16)
nj1 =
AD + C
(1 BD) ; (17)
where C < 0 and B < 0. Since ( C=D) < A and B < A, we can be sure that ni1 > 0 and nj1 > 0.
At higher levels of inequality, the level of conict initiated by group i, is greater than what group j
can tolerate, that is, A > ( C=D). Hence group j engages in conict to counter the conict initiated
20I2 (the maximum level of inequality) is the level of inequality such that max(ni1 ; n
j
1 ) = 1.
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by group i. One can easily check that 0 < ni1  A  1 and 0 < nj1  1. The overall level of conict
will be the total of (16) and (17) i.e.
n1 = n
i
1 + n
j
1 =
A+ ( B)( C) +AD   ( C)
1 + ( B)D :
In the Appendix (Proposition A3) we show that (@n1=@Ia2 ) > 0. This means that as inequality
increases further, the level of conict also increases. Note, here the disadvantaged group reduces
its own level of conict. Since in this case ( B) < 1, the decrease of conict by the disadvantaged
group is more than made up by the increase in the advantaged groups conict. Therefore, the overall
level of conict increases by more than it would have under the increased level of inequality if the
advantaged group did not join in.
On the question of joint or own production under high inequality, it can be shown that when a
group reaches I
a
2, they prefer own production (see Appendix, Proposition A4). This is because the
excessive level of inequality leads to such a high level of conict thereby reducing the net income of
the groups from joint production to such a level that own production becomes a better alternative.
Since both groups engage in joint production at bIa2 but decide for own production at Ia2, there must
exist some eIa2 2 bIa2 ; Ia2 such that
min
h
V iS   V iJ ; V jS   V jJ
i
= 0;
where for any group m, V mS and V
m
J represents its total benet from own production and joint
production respectively. This condition shows the level of inequality in which at least one of the
groups will be indi¤erent between joint production and own production.
We therefore discuss the possibility of two cases: (a) bIa2 < Ia2 < eIa2 and (b) eIa2  Ia2  Ia2. As
earlier, in both these cases, in the second period there is no conict and both groups engage in
joint production. When bIa2 < Ia2 < eIa2 both groups will continue to be in joint production and the
equilibrium will be as given next.
Proposition 4 Given bIa2 < Ia2 < eIa2 , the subgame perfect equilibrium is (ni1 > 0; nj1 > 0; hi1 (ni1 ; nj1 ) =
1; hj1 (n
i
1 ; n
j
1 ) = 1) and (n
i
2 = 0; n
j
2 = 0, h
i
2 (n
i
2 ; n
j
2 ) = 1; h
j
2 (n
i
2 ; n
j
2 ) = 1).
Note that with a higher initial wealth w0, the inequality eIa2 where the switch from joint production
to own production takes place is lowered. Thus for wealthier societies, the inequality interval over
which both groups would engage in conict would be reduced.
When eIa2  Ia2  Ia2, clearly either group i or group j drops out of joint production. Since in our
model own wealth is indestructible, and conict is costly, we get the following equilibrium.
Proposition 5 Given eIa2  Ia2  Ia2, the subgame perfect equilibrium is (ni1 = 0; nj1 = 0; hi1 (ni1 ; nj1 ) =
0; hj1 (n
i
1 ; n
j
1 ) = 0) and (n
i
2 = 0; n
j
2 = 0, h
i
2 (n
i
2 ; n
j
2 ) = 1; h
j
2 (n
i
2 ; n
j
2 ) = 1).
The above proposition shows that under some circumstances there will be no joint production in
period 1. Hence, unlike other cases, although ex-ante there is a possibility of conict, ex-post no
conict will take place.
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3.4 Inequality and Total Conict
So where does all this leave us when it comes to the question about the link between inequality and
conict? As is clear from the above discussion, until Ia2, there will be no conict, since inequality is
low. However, beyond Ia2, we know there is a positive amount of conict since the disadvantaged group
engages in conict. Conict now increases steadily with an increase in inequality until bIa2 . Then
from bIa2 onwards both groups are engaged in conict and the overall level of conict also increases.
Now as inequality increases, conict again steadily rises until it reaches eIa2 . At eIa2 , for group i, high
levels of conict make joint production inviable. This is captured in Figure 5 below.
Insert Figure 5.
Therefore one can state the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The relationship between inequality and conict is non-monotonic.
We would like to emphasize that the non-monotonicity in our model results from a sharp change in
the level of conict arising out of groups preferring own production beyond a certain level of inequality.
Although Milante (2004) also nds a non-monotonic relationship, unlike ours this is reected in an
inverted-U relationship between inequality and conict. Hence, in his model, over a certain level of
inequality, there is a gradual decrease of conict as inequality rises.
4 Discussions
In this section we discuss changes to some assumptions so far made in this model and how they impact
on the results. In particular we deal with four of the assumptions: (a) the rate of savings are the
same for both the groups, (b) the proportion of self damageis equal for both groups, (c) that groups
have foresight, and (d) the absence of xed costs.
Rate of savings. Suppose instead of having the same savings rate, consider without loss of
generality, that i < j . Further assume that rj = ri = 1. This would mean that wi2 < w
j
2,
and therefore from the distribution rule it would be obvious that yi2 < y
j
2. Group i again is the
disadvantaged group. The rest of the analysis will follow through, so long as our inequality now
measures the di¤erence between the two savings rates, i.e. Ia2 = (
j   i) where  = R1=2. Along
with this if we had assumed that rj > 1 the results in the previous sections would only be amplied.
However, if i > j and at the same time rj > 1, the results derived in the earlier sections will
now depend on which of these has greater impact. Obviously, since the relative rate of return and
the relative rate of savings are going in opposite directions, the results in the earlier sections will be
dampened. Since we were interested in understanding the impact of inequality on conict, distilling
all else, we had assumed i = j .
Proportion of self damage. Thus far we have assumed that the proportion of self damage, k,
is the same for all the groups and k = (1=2). As mentioned earlier, for 0 < k < 1, all the results
derived earlier will hold. Here we shall discuss a few cases when k takes extreme values and when
the k varies between groups.
First, when k = 0 for both groups, the reaction function of group i and j are, respectively, (derived
from (13) and (14)) ni1 = (=2)r
j > 0 and nj1 = (=2) > 0. Clearly, now both groups will engage
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in conict irrespective of the level of inequality and the level of conict will depend on the rate of
return of the rival group. This is not surprising, since k > 0 makes it costly for groups to engage in
conict by reducing both their current and future levels of consumption. The overall level of conict
will be higher now.
Next, let k = 1 for both the groups. Recall that the way conict works in this model is that under
high inequality, the disadvantaged group wants to reduce the amount of income devoted to savings
by the advantaged group so that, even with a relatively higher return, the advantaged group does
not receive a higher level of the output in the future. Now with k = 1, this will be extremely costly.
Under this assumption, so long as rj > 1, from (13) and (14) the reactions functions of group i and
j will be
ni1 =

2w
(Ia2   2)

1  nj1

;
nj1 =  

2w
(Ia2 + 2)
 
1  ni1

:
Thus, group i, the disadvantaged group will be the only group involved in conict and that too
when Ia2 > 2. Group j, irrespective of the level of inequality and group is level of conict, will not
engage in conict. It is easy to see if the level of self damage of group i is, ki = 0 and of group j is,
kj = 1, then the earlier result will be amplied in the sense that now group i will engage in conict
irrespective of the level of inequality and group j will never engage in conict. On the other hand,
if ki = 1 and kj = 0, group j will always engage in conict and group i will engage in conict only
when inequality is high, i.e. Ia2 > 2. In this situation, unlike the standard results, it will be the
advantaged group which will engage in conict.
Information. Our model assumes that groups have perfect foresight. Hence they can anticipate
future inequalities perfectly. This, however, is not very realistic. One way to bring in imperfect
information in the model would be to assume that both the groups know the distributions of rj and
ri. In that case the anticipated future inequality will then be given by Ia2 = (E(r
j) E(ri))w, where
E(r) is the expected rate of return. Thus the conditions under which groups will initiate conict
will remain the same except for inequality being interpreted as expected anticipated future inequality.
Hence, all the results that we have discussed earlier will also go through for a case of imperfect
foresight. In the event of complete uncertainty, however, the analysis will be more complex and will
depend on the groups behaviour. If, for instance, the groups presume that the rates of returns are
going to be the same, then obviously there will be no reason for conict arising from future inequality.
Fixed Cost. In our model both groups have to bear a cost to engage in conict. Without it,
groups would always engage in conict. We have considered the cost of conict entering the model
in two ways. First, a group engaging in conict will also inict some damage to their own share of
output and, second, there is a mobilization cost of conict. In a broad sense both these costs can be
classied as variable costs, that is the higher the level of conict the greater will be these costs. Both
groups, however, will also typically incur a set of xed costs if they decide to engage in conict. The
xed costs may reect, among others, the costs involved in forming the groups, and the minimum
physical infrastructure that may be needed to run a conict. Boix et al. (2006) argues that any
group engaging in conict will face both xed and variable costs. In our model, so far, we have just
considered the variable costs. Now suppose that the mobilization of the cost of conict includes a
xed cost F in addition to the variable cost of
 
(nmt )
2dmt =2

that is considered in the model. Under
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such circumstances group i maximises the following
eV i = ( V i   F if ni1 > 0
V i otherwise
where V i is based on equation (9). Group js objective function will be similarly changed in the
presence of xed costs.
The addition of the xed costs will not change any of the equilibrium condition, hence the threshold
inequality levels at which the groups start engaging in conict remains unchanged. The level of
conict, however, will increase taking into account the xed costs. It is clear from Figure 5 above
that, until Ia2, there will be no conict due to low inequality. Beyond I
a
2, however, there is a positive
amount of conict by the disadvantaged group. Since to engage in conict the groups have to incur
a xed cost, we will now nd a discontinuous jump in the level of conict at Ia2. Similarly we will
nd another discontinuous jump at bIa2 , this time due to the advantaged group engaging in conict.
The discontinuity between inequality and conict will now be at three levels of inequality: Ia2, bIa2 andeIa2 . Thus around each of these levels there will be sharp changes in the level of conict. Hence there
may be cases with similar levels of anticipated future inequality but very di¤erent levels of conict.
5 Conclusion
The purpose of the paper was to analyze the interlinkages between group inequality and conict. In
our analysis we nd that although inequality may cause conict, the impact of inequality on conict
is not straightforward. Since conict is costly for both groups, societies with low levels of inequality,
in our model, show no conict. It is only when inequality increases beyond a threshold, that the
disadvantaged group engages in conict. At higher levels of inequality both groups engage in conict.
Thus, our model is able to capture both rebellion by the disadvantaged group and also suppression
by the advantaged group. El Salvador and Guatemala are examples where the state acting on behalf
of the advantaged group unleashed severe repression to curb insurgencies. When inequality reaches
extreme levels, the economy goes back to subsistence levels as the high output joint production sector
is not developed for fear of severe rebellion. For instance, the Bougainville rebellion, arising out of a
concern for the local environment and the lack of benets to the local populace, led to the closure of
copper mines, thus leading to a decline in the income of the region.21
It is important to note that the traditional sense of grievanceis absent in this model since both
groups have the same level of income and wealth in the period in which conict occurs. Groups,
however, anticipate future levels of inequality which may precipitate conict in the current period.
Thus our analysis demonstrates the crucial role future inequality plays. Equality in the current period
does not stop conict from taking place today if the future inequality is signicant. In Sri Lanka, for
instance, only when the government failed to guarantee the rights of Tamils (and also curtailed their
access to higher education), did the Tamil insurgency begin in earnest.22 The government policies
21See Bougainville-The Long Struggle to Freedom by Moses and Rikha Havini. Available at http://www.eco-
action.org/dt/bvstory.html. (Accessed August 2010)
22Sri Lanka had su¤ered from serious ethno-religious conict between the Sinhalese majority and the
Tamil minority for nearly three decades. For details about the insurgency in Sri Lanka refer to:
http://www.onwar.com/aced/nation/sat/srilank/ftamil1983.html. (Accessed October 20, 2010)
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were seen as a potential source of future inequality where the Tamils would lose out signicantly.
This brings us to the policy implications of our results. Since the future plays an important role
in fostering conict, one has to put in place policies that will reduce future inequality. For example,
the warring factions in Sudan decided to split future prots from the oil wells equally.23 If such
egalitarian rules can be institutionalized and implemented, then reasons for conict will denitely
diminish. However, typically if one of the groups becomes weaker(maybe due to exogenous shocks)
in terms of bargaining, the stronger groups tend to capture a higher share of the joint output and that
is when the problems start again.24 This may explain why so many peace agreements fail. What
is implicit here is that enforceable contracts are not viable and therefore parties cannot forge some
kind of ex-ante contract to avoid conict. If, however, we allow for long-term interaction between
the groups, there may be a possibility of overcoming the incomplete contract problem.25 What the
structure will be of such long-term contracts under uncertainty is an issue for future research.
23SHRO-CAIRO Position on Sudan Peace Deal and Constitutional Panel, Sudan Tribune, May 7, 2005. Available
at http://www.sudantribune.com. (Accessed April 2011)
24 Infact the current hostilities in Sudan started after the discovery of oil in the south, which none of the parties were
aware of when signing the Addis Ababa peace deal in 1972 ( Human Rights Watch, 2003).
25For a very interesting application of contract theory to conict refer to Azam and Mesnard (2003) .
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A Appendix
First we show the existence of equilibrium in the game G. The proof is constructed using standard
arguments found in game theory texts such as Fudenberg and Tirole (1991).
Proposition A.1 There exists a pure strategy equilibrium in G.
Proof: First let us start with stage 2 game in period 2. The strategies for groups i and j; nit 2 [0; 1]
and njt 2 [0; 1] are compact for t = 1; 2. Since period 1 payo¤ is already known for group j, and the
total income is consumed in the last period, the period 2 payo¤, from (9) is,
V j2 (n
i
2; n
j
2) =
(
maxf(1  k:ni2):(1  nj2):dm2   12 :(nj2)2:dj2g if hi2 = 1, hj2 = 1
wj2 otherwise
:
V j2 (n
j
2) is continuous and quasi-concave in n
j
2. Similarly V
i
2 (n
i
2; n
j
2) is continuous and quasi-concave
in ni2. From Theorem 1.2 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991), we know there exists a pure strategy
equilibrium (ni2 ; n
j
2 ) in stage 2 of period 2. In Stage 1, since Yt = 0, when h
i
t = 0 or h
j
t = 0, the
groups will either both choose own production, i.e.(hit = 0 and h
j
t = 0), or both will choose joint
production i.e. (hit = 1 and h
j
t = 1). Whether (h
i
2 = 0, h
j
2 = 0) or (h
i
2 = 1, h
j
2 = 1) will depend on
(ni2 ; n
j
2 ). Therefore the subgame perfect equilibrium would be (h
i
2 = 0, h
j
2 = 0, n
i
2 ; n
j
2 ) or (h
i
2 = 1,
hj2 = 1, n
i
2 ; n
j
2 ). Hence, there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in period 2. Let that equilibrium
level of payo¤ for group j in period 2 be V j2 . Payo¤ in stage 2 of period 1 for group j can then be
written as
V j(ni1; n
j
1) =
(
(1  )(1  kni1)(1  nj1)di1   12(nj1)2:dj1 + V j2 if hi1 = 1, hj1 = 1,
wj1 otherwise,
which is continuous and quasi-concave in nj1. Through similar argument as above we can show
V i(ni1; n
j
1) is continuous and quasi-concave in n
i
1. Therefore, from Theorem 1.2 of Fudenberg and
Tirole (1991) there exists a pure strategy equilibrium in (ni1 ; n
j
1 ) stage 2 of period 1. Using similar
arguments as earlier, we can deduce that the subgame perfect equilibrium in period 1 would be
(hi1 = 0, h
j
1 = 0, n
i
1 ; n
j
1 ) or (h
i
1 = 1, h
j
1 = 1, n
i
1 ; n
j
1 ). Since both periods 1 and 2 have pure strategy
equilibriums, the game G will also have a pure strategy equilibrium. 
Next we formally show the existence of a level of inequality, which clearly demarcates high in-
equality from medium or low inequality in our model. Referring back to Figure 2, A is the intercept
term of group is reaction function and ( C=D) is group js, both of which are dependent on the level
of inequality. We dene the lower bound of the high inequality interval as the level of inequality at
which ( C=D) = A.
Proposition A.2 There exists a level of inequality, bI2, where ( C=D) = A.
Proof: Let f = (( C=D) A). Further,
@( C=D)
@Ia2
=

(2 + Ia2 )
2
and
@A
@Ia2
=

2
=
1  
2
: (A1)
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Hence,
@f
@I2
= 

1
(2 + Ia2 )
2
  1  
22

< 0 for I2  0 and 0 <  < (1=2)..
We know that for Ia2  2; ( C=D) > A, which implies that at Ia2 = 2; f > 0. Now consider
the level of inequality I 0a2 such that A = 1. At this level Ia2 > 2, and A = 1 > ( C=D) (since
D > ( C) for all Ia2 ). Hence for I 0a2 , f < 0. Therefore, by the Intermediate Value Theorem we can
nd an bIa2 2 (2; I 0a2 ) such that at bIa2 , f = 0, implying ( C=D) = A. Further, since @f=@Ia2 < 0 for
all Ia2  2, bIa2 will be unique. 
Third, we demonstrate that under high inequality the total level of conict will increase with
inequality. Recall that in this case the disadvantaged group reduces its level of conict and the
advantaged group increases its level of conict, with an increase in inequality.
Proposition A.3 For all Ia2 > bIa2 , (@n1=@Ia2 ) > 0.
Proof: Di¤erentiating both groupsbest response functions (i.e. (13) and (14)) with respect to I
we get
@ni1
@Ia2
=
@A
@Ia2
  @( B)
@Ia2
nj1   ( B)
@nj1
@Ia2
;
@nj1
@Ia2
=  @( C)
@Ia2
+
@D
@Ia2
ni1 +D
@ni1
@Ia2
:
Solving these for group i we get
(1 + ( B):D)@n
i
1
@Ia2
=
@A
@Ia2
  @( B)
@Ia2
nj1 + ( B)
@( C)
@Ia2
+ ( B) @D
@Ia2
ni1:
Noting that nj1  1; @A@Ia2 >
@( B)
@Ia2
> 0 and @( C)@Ia2 > 0;
@D
@Ia2
> 0, the above equation implies @n
i
1
@Ia2
> 0.
Similarly the result will hold for group j. Since both @n
i
1
@Ia2
> 0 and @n
j
1
@Ia2
> 0, we can conclude @n1@Ia2
> 0.

Finally, we show that when the inequality level becomes excessive, this would lead to own produc-
tion instead of joint production.
Proposition A.4 When inequality is Ia2, groups will choose own production over joint production.
Proof: For the high inequality case, whether nj1 > n
i
1 or n
j
1 < n
i
1 depends on parametric
specications. Let us consider the case where ni1 > n
j
1 . Since by denition, at I
a
2, max(n
i
1 ; n
j
1 ) = 1,
this implies that at I
a
2, n
i
1 = 1 and from (17), n
j
1 = (=4). Using (5) and (9), group is payo¤ from
joint production will then be
(1  )(1  
4
)
R1
4
  R1
4
+ (=2)(R2 + (1  
4
)
R1
4
+ (1  rj)w0): (A2)
On the other hand group is payo¤ under own production will be
(1  )w0 + (=2)(R2 + (1  rj)w0): (A3)
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Subtracting (A3) from (A2) and rearranging the terms we get
 

1  (1  
4
)((1  ) + 
2
)
 R1
4
 

(1  )  
2

w0   rj 
2
(1  )w0 < 0;
since, (1   )   > 0 and 0 <  < 1. Therefore group i will drop out of joint production before
inequality reaches I
a
2, which would also imply from (1) that group j will also not engage in joint
production. Similarly one can also show that when nj1 > n
i
1 , and at I
a
, nj1 = 1, group j will prefer
own production to joint production and therefore group i will also not engage in joint production. 
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